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1 Introduction
International development targets have become a
prominent feature of development discourse in
recent years. Many different targets have been
adopted by consensus at UN conferences on child
health, gender equality, education, poverty reduc-
tion and nutrition; and a selection of these targets
has been brought together and widely dissemi-
nated by the Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) of the OECD, in a publication entitled
Shaping the 21st century: the contribution of
development cooperation' (OECD 1996) (Table 1).
This document, in turn, has influenced national
policy statements like the recent UK White Paper
on international development, which committed
the British government to the DAC targets, espe-
cially the goal of reducing absolute poverty by half
by 2015 (UK 1997).
Set aside for a moment the question of whether the
right targets and time-scales have been chosen -
though it is notable that nutrition and food security
seem to have dropped through the DAC net for the
21st century Are targets in general a good idea?
The case in favour was summarised in the 1997
Human Development Report, in the following words,
using the example of the World Summit for
Children (WSC) in 1990:
Goals set at UN Conferences are often met with
scepticism. But the achievements following the
World Summit for Children in 1990 show that
a different response may be warranted. The
first-ever summit on human issues set 7 major
(and 20 supporting) goals, most to be achieved
by the year 2000. Mid-decade goals were
added later ... Progress has been made . . The
summït ... helped raise general awareness
Low cost and cost-effective actions (made) it
possible to achieve the goals by restructuring
budgets rather than by making big increases in
spending. Monitoring was also vital ... Up-to-
date information (is) widely used to assess
progress and mobilise and maintain support.
[UNDP 1997:111]
I am grateful to the guest editors of the special issue of
Canadian Journal of Development Studies, Vol. XIX, 1998
for their comments, and to Francesca Cook, Aidan Cox
and other colleagues. Responsibility, of course, is mine. I
acknowledge permission from the Canadian Journal of
Development Studies to reproduce this article.
Table 1: International development targets
Universal primary education
Gender equality





Based on this information, targets provide political
impetus as well as funding which is perhaps more
generous, but certainly more finely tuned. The
monitoring of targets helps in programme imple-
mentation and helps mobilise and maintain public
support. Targets, in other words, do good.
A contrary view exists, however. I have argued else-
where that targets do not go far enough in specify-
ing the commitments that states will make to their
citizens, or in providing a framework of account-
ability (Maxwell 1996a, 1998).2 A more general
argument against international targets might be for-
mulated as follows:
In this connection, it is worth re-emphasising that
international targets adopted by UN Conferences are
voluntary and have no status in international law.
Social development
There should be universal primary education in all countries by 2015
(Jomtien, Beijing, Copenhagen)
Progress towards gender equality and the empowerment of women
should be demonstrated by eliminating gender disparity in primary and
secondary education by 2005 (Cairo, Beijing, Copenhagen)
The death rate of infants and children under the age of five years
should be reduced in each developing country by two-thirds the 1990
level by 2015 (Cairo)
The rate of maternal mortality should be reduced by three-fourths
between 1990 and 2015 (Cairo, Beijing)
Access should be available through the primary health-care system to
reproductive health services for all individuals of appropriate ages, no
later than the year 2015 (Cairo)
Environmental sustainability and regeneration
A current national strategy for sustainable development should be
in the process of implementation in every country by 2005, to ensure
hat current trends in the loss of environmental resources are effectively
reversed at both global and national levels by 2015 (Rio)
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International targets over-simplify and over-
generalise complex problems. They distort pub-
lic expenditure priorities, both because they
misrepresent the problem, and because they
privilege some sectors at the expense of others.
Monitoring progress is extremely expensive and
detracts from action on the ground. And the
political benefits, though appreciable at first,
may rapidly decrease if targets are not achieved.
We need to test this argument, and apply it specifi-
cally to food security We must then ask whether
there is a way forward that meets the objections
while preserving the benefits. As we do so, we will
Economic well-being
Reducing extreme poverty The proportion of people living in extreme poverty in developing
countries should be reduced by at least one-half by 2015 (Copenhagen)
come to see that 'subsidiarity', or devolution to
lower levels of authority, is an appropriate guiding
principle. It has significant implications for the
interpretation and measurement of targets.
2 The Sceptical Argument
Unpacked
In the brief summary above, I have ascribed to the
sceptics four questions about a target-driven
approach.
2.1 Are targets reductionist?
First, there is a question about whether simple
international targets abstract from and therefore
misrepresent the complex reality of life as it is lived
by poor people. This form of reductionism is, of
course, a general issue in development studies, one
Robert Chambers has done much to publicise. In a
recent book, he remarks that
Reductionism is reducing the complex and var-
ied to the simple and standard... Problems arise
because the simplifications, standardisations
and controls which work (in the natural sci-
ences) have been transferred to the human sci-
ences, and to the other more complex
intersections of the ecological and biological
sciences with people and their needs. In
diverse, dynamic and uncontrollable conditions
with continuous variance and multiple link-
ages, reductionist methods can be both costly
and misleading. Yet many professionals seem
driven compulsively to simplify what is com-
plex and to standardise what is diverse.
]Chambers 1997: 421
Poverty provides a good illustration of the problem.
In the DAC 2 ist century document, the target is to
reduce the proportion of people living in extreme
poverty by one half by 2015, where poverty is
defined as an annual income of less than US$ 1 a
day (in 1985 purchasing power parity dollars). The
measure is simple and standard, in Chambers' ter-
minology, but also deeply misleading.
This is because poverty is multi-dimensional, and it
contains a large element of subjective feeling.
UNDP has argued this point and presents a wider
framework of human capability suggesting that
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poverty is too complex to be reduced to a single
dimension of human life. . . . although income
focuses on an important dimension of poverty,
it gives only a partial picture of the many ways
human life can be blighted.., deprivation (can-
not) be fully captured by the level of .. income.
]UNDP 1997: 15-16].
The debate between broad and narrow perspectives
on poverty is very well established in the literature
(see, for example, Baulch i996a). Poverty has been
given a new piquancy by the debate in developed
countries around the new concept of social exclu-
sion, which again emphasises multiple deprivation
as a key component of the concept of poverty (de
Haan and Maxwell 1998). In both the old and new
literatures on alternative definitions of poverty
access to health, education and other services plays
an important part. Subjective feelings are also
important. Poverty and social exclusion are often
defined as powerlessness, lack of autonomy and
loss of self-esteem (Chambers 1983, Schaffer
1996).
From the point of view of international targets,
multi-dimensionality does not matter if all the indi-
cators are closely correlated. In such a case, any one
indicator will stand as a proxy for the others. Thus,
income poverty might not capture the full reality of
poverty on its own, but it would serve perfectly well
both to identify the poor and to measure the extent
of their deprivation.
Unfortunately, this view ïs hard to sustain. In some
circumstances, multiple deprivation may mean that
all the indicators agree. In other circumstances,
however, they may not. For example, the UNDP
argue the following
Someone can enjoy good health and live quite
long but be illiterate and thus cut off from
learning, from communication and from inter-
action with others. Another person may be lit-
erate and quite well educated but prone to
premature death because of the epidemic eco-
logical characteristics or physical disposition.
Yet a third may be excluded from participating
in the important decision-making processes
affecting her life. The deprivation of none of
them can be fully captured by the level of theír
income. [UNDP 1997: 16]
Examples of lack of correlation in this sense
abound. For example, Kabeer (1997) cites that a
high income will not allow an 'untouchable' to
drink from the village well, or parents from a
socially conservative area to send their daughters to
school. In these circumstances, a single poverty tar-
get can point policymakers in the wrong direction.
This matters because of the second objection to a
target-driven programme, namely that targets dis-
tort policy
2.2 Do targets distort policy?
The distortion issue arises at various levels. First,
which sectors are privileged and which are not?
Sectors that are fortunate enough to have been the
subject of an international conference are likely to
benefit from high visibility and from target-driven
increases in resources. Sectors that are not so fortu-
nate are likely to become the orphans of public
expenditure reviews. Writing elsewhere, I have tried
to give a graphic illustration of the problem:
Pity the poor minister who has to fight their
corner without the benefit of the President's sig-
nature on the latest (international) declaration.
If I were running the International Civil
Aviation Authority or the Universal Postal
Union, I would be organising a summit before
you could say 'potholes in the runway' or
'queues at the post office. [Maxwell 1996a: 61
This is, of course, a serious matter. The DAC targets
provide a case in point. They have become hege-
monic in the international discourse, but are delib-
erately selective. From a food security point of view,
we can understand that they were published before
the World Food Summit (WFS), and therefore do
not mention the WFS target of halving the number
of undernourished people by 2015 (WFS 1996: 1).
However, it is harder to understand why the DAC
did not incorporate the nutrition goals of the WSC
(UNICEF 1991) or the International Conference on
Nutrition (FAO and WHO 1992). Is it assumed that
low birth weight, anaemia and iodine deficiency are
somehow subsumed in a general poverty target? Or
are they considered to be less important?
Remember that leaving them out would not matter
Vitamin-A supplementation can have a marked impact
on morbidity and mortality For example, a mcta-
analysis of eight large-scale trials showed that
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if everything were related to everything else, but
everything isn't.
Adopting targets, therefore, does risk making pol-
icy more blinkered. In the quotation about the
WSC, reproduced above from the 1997 Human
Development Report, the implication was that
international goals could be achieved by restruc-
turing budgets, rather than by increasing the level
of expenditure. This might suggest that worries
about distorting policy are misplaced. That inter-
pretation would be too generous, however. Even
if it were true, which is debatable, choices within
individual sectoral budgets, taking the form of
legitimate 'restructuring', could well mean that
some dimensions of poverty were privileged over
others. For example, the ministry of health might
have to decide between a straight income transfer
to families, designed to bring per capita income
up to one dollar a day, and a vitamin-A supple-
mentation programme, which may not increase
income, but which may have pronounced health
benefits.3
2.3 What is the opportunity cost of
monitoring progress?
This example of choosing between income transfers
and Vitamin-A supplementation illustrates an
important truth about scarce resources. In a liber-
alised economy, public expenditure is the main
instrument of economic policy, and the public
expenditure process the main arena in which arbi-
tration takes place between competing policy prior-
ities. In this context, monitoring progress toward
targets is itself a public expense, and therefore has
an opportunity cost.
How high this cost is depends on the complexity of
the targets. Simple-sounding targets, like halving
dollar-a-day poverty, may themselves be difficult to
measure: a dollar-a-day, yes, but what assumptions
must be made about purchasing power, variability
in price levels, the valuation of subsistence produc-
tion, seasonality or other variation in income, intra-
household distribution and a multitude of other
technical issues? These are not trivial problems. A
recent review of World Bank poverty assessments in
supplementation in areas characterised by xerophthalmia
(an indicator of Vitamin A deficiency) reduced child
mortality by a startling 23% (Beaton et al. 1993).
sub-Saharan Africa concluded that the evolving
practice was 'problematic at several levels':
First, the many problems of collecting data to
support analyses of poverty over time and space
which build analytically on a money metric
measure of well-being income or consumption
have yet to be adequately solved and it may
even be that the present degree of reliance on
such an approach should be reduced. [Hanmer
et al. 1997: 8.31
If the targets are broadened to include other
aspects, the difficulties increase commensurately
For example, the discussion in Europe about social
exclusion has generated many alternative indicators
of poverty, including such aspects as employment
rights, participation in community institutions and
social esteem (Oppenheim and Harker 1996). A
recent study of non-monetary indicators of poverty
and social exclusion produced an eleven-page list of
indicators, including self-image, social identity and
ability to cope with stress (CESIS 1997).
Some have argued that the use of participatory
methods can cut through the complexity, give a
higher priority to people's own perceptions and
simultaneously cut costs. Participatory methods are
certainly ethically attractive, and they greatly enrich
analysis (Chambers 1997), but their very diversity
makes it difficult to use them to monitor interna-
tional targets. This is because of the well-known
problem of aggregation. Baulch makes the point
succinctly:
the participatory approach empowers the
poor. But at the regional and national level, it is
usually impossible to aggregate the matrices of
poor peoples' priorities generated by participa-
tory methods. One or two common themes,
such as the lack of synchronicity between agri-
cultural earnings and the payment dates for
school fees, or the importance of all-weather
roads, may emerge. With many issues, however,
the realities of the poor in different locations are
simply too diverse to yield any coherent recom-
mendations for policymakers at the national or
regional level. [Baulch 1996b: 39-401
This is an important philosophical point, to which
we shall return. Baulch accepts that participatory
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methods yield very diverse pictures of poverty, and
dismisses them because no simple, replicable
answers emerge. The proponents of participatory
methods would argue that this is one of their core
strengths, and that there are no simple, replicable
answers. Policy, they would argue, needs to abstract
from reductionism, and adapt to the complex and
diverse reality on the ground (Chambers 1997).
This is an approach I have dubbed 'post-modern'
(Maxwell 1996b).
Be that as it may, we are still left with a problem. If
international targets work at all, they work because
progress toward them can be monitored. But moni-
toring is expensive, and the cost must be weighed
against other claims on public expenditure. The
more subtle the targets, the more expensive moni-
toring is likely to be.
There is one further point, which is that cost must
be measured in the time of scarce, skilled profes-
sionals, as well as in money One of the arguments
against targetry is that the very measurement
process becomes the dominant activity of policy-
makers, caught up in workshops to decide indica-
tors, and expensive projects to collect data. The
DAC targets themselves have already given rise to a
large work load for statisticians and professional
advisers in the development ministries of OECD
countries (DAC 1997). A similar point can be made
about the follow-up to the WFS. There is an anal-
ogy here with work on early warning systems for
drought in Africa: the investment in information
may not be matched by investment in action, so
that the link between early warning and response
becomes 'the missing link' (Buchanan-Smith and
Davies 1995). To paraphrase Marshal McLuhan,
'the message itself becomes the message'.
2.4 Can unrealistic targets destroy
political momentum?
A final question is about the political value of tar-
gets. The justification for targets is that they help
mobilise and sustain political support for actions to
help the poor. Indeed they do. The use of the DAC
targets has been impressive, for example, in the UK
White Paper on development, and in the political
discourse that surrounds it.
It should not be surprising that international targets
should be expected to help focus the mind. Targets
are commonplace in private and public sector
organisations. Targets are used here to motivate
employees, and to monitor progress. For example, a
recent text on team management argues that
The purpose of clear goals is to ensure that peo-
ple know what the team is trying to achieve,
mobilising their enthusiasm, curiosity, energy,
creativity and talent. Goals justify the team
existence. [Leigh and Maynard 1995:52[
This text could be inscribed without shame on the
portals of UNICEF the DAC or Britain's Department
for International Development. There are practical
implications, too. The same management text
reminds us that teams thrive on clear goals, and sug-
gests using SMART goals, which are (a) Stretching,
(b) Measurable, (c) Agreed, (d) Recorded, and (e)
Time-limited. [Leigh and Maynard 1995: 220[
At first sight, the DAC targets for the 21st century
appear to qualify as SMART goals, with one possi-
ble exception - the core poverty target is stronger
than the wording of the international conference
from which it was derived, namely the Social
Summit held in Copenhagen in 1995. The Summit
merely stated that countries would define their own
poverty targets and work toward them. In this
sense, the DAC target, which is more specific, is not
'agreed' upon by those who will have to carry the
main burden of implementation, the governments
of developing countries.
If there is a problem, it is that the goals may appear
to be unrealistic and set too far into the future. In
principle, goals should be stretching and it is
acceptable that they may initially appear unrealistic.
There are problems, however, if targets appear to be
hopelessly unrealistic or too long-term. Consider
these quotations from the same management text:
Without agreement, goals are likely to remain
aspirations, rather than becoming successful
outcomes. [ibid: 62[
Deadlines of two or three years are hard to get
excited about. They may need to be reduced to
more practical, shorter-term steps. [ibid: 64[
Seen in these terms, it is not difficult to be a little
cynical about the latest enthusiasm for ambitious
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international targets, set twenty years in the future.
Many past targets have not been achieved, and run
the risk of becoming discredited as a result: the UN
target that 0.7% of GNP should be provided as aid
is a good example. Remember also Henry
Kissinger's pledge, adopted at the World Food
Conference in 1974, that 'within a decade, no child
should go hungry to bed'. There is something dis-
turbingly aspirational about many targets, and the
DAC 21st century targets are no exception. A time
line of 20 years is part of the problem. How many
of the civil servants who devised these targets, and
how many of the politicians who use them, will still
be active in 2015? UNICEF, perhaps, has had the
right idea, with the development of mid-decade tar-
gets for the goals of the WSC. A five-year perspec-
tive would seem to be the outer limit of realism for
SMART goals.
In sum, a target-based approach to international
development policy is like a curate's egg - excellent
in parts. We should not neglect the obvious politi-
cal attractions, nor the galvanising effect of targets.
The translation of SMART targets from the manage-
ment arena to the international development arena
has many benefits. At the same time, it is surely not
irresponsible, as the title of this article suggests, to
be mildly sceptical. Targets are indeed reductionist,
they do run the risk of distorting spending plans;
they can be expensive to monitor; and there are
political risks if they are not met. We need a prag-
matic solution to the dilemma, and we will come to
it. First, though, we must ask how far the general
debate can be applied to the arena of food security
3 An Application to Food Security
Food security has not been exempt from the enthu-
siasm for targets and, as has been the case in other
sectors, the fashion has gathered momentum with
the years. Henry Kissinger's remark aside, the 1974
World Food Conference was not over-weighted
with targets. The Universal Declaration on the
Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition, adopted as
the principal policy statement of the conference,
contained no precise quantitative targets. However,
the first supporting resolution stated that
all Governments should accept the removal of
the scourge of hunger and malnutrition, which at
present afflicts many millions of human beings,
as the objective of the international community
as a whole, and should accept the goal that within
a decade no child will go to bed hungry, that nofam-
uy will fear for its next day's bread, and that no
human being's future and capacities will be stunted
by malnutrition. [emphasis added] [UN 1975: 4]
The objective here is phrased in general, even mel-
lifluous, terms, effectively as a target to eliminate under
nutrition within a decade (i.e. by 1984). It is then
interesting to find one of the new institutions set up by
the World Food Conference, the World Food Council,
adopting a similar target in 1989, a full 15 years later.
This body's ministerial meeting, held in Cairo in 1989,
adopted the Cairo Declaration and Programme of
Cooperative Action, which committed countries to
work toward four key goals for the 1990s:
the elimination of starvation and death caused
by famine
a substantive reduction of malnutrition and
mortality among young children
a tangible reduction in chronic hunger
the elimination of major nutritional deficiency
diseases (WFC 1990: 2).
lt seems that by 1989, the target of reducing under-
nutrition had not only been watered down (from
'elimination' in 1974 to a 'tangible reduction' in
1989), but also postponed, from 1984 to the end of
the 1990s.
Conferences following the Cairo Declaration pro-
duced variations on similar themes. In 1990, the
WSC addressed a wide range of issues, including
food and nutrition, and set targets for malnutrition,
low birth-weight and micro-nutrient deficiency, all
to be achieved by 2000. The ICN, meeting two
years later but working to the same time frame,
adopted and amended some of these targets, adding
the elimination of famine-related deaths, and speci-
fying a 'substantial reduction' in chronic hunger.
The main food-related targets of these two confer-
ences are reproduced in Table 2.
The WFS, held in 1996, might have reaffirmed ear-
lier targets and reviewed the time frame. The WFS
plan of action did, in principle, 'strive to consolidate
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the results of other UN Conferences since 1990 on
subjects having a bearing on food security' (WFS
1996: 9). However, in practice, the only target that
survived the intense negotiations leading up to the
Summit was a commitment in the 'Rome
Declaration on World Food Security', to 'reduce the
number of undernourished people to half their pre-
sent level no later than 2015' (WFS 1996: 1). The
key number presented to the Summit was that 840
million people were currently chronically under-
nourished, so that the target for 2015 could be
rewritten as a total of no more than 420 million peo-
pie under-nourished by 2015.
As with other meetings, the WFS laid special empha-
sis on monitoring progress toward the target. It called
for a mid-term review, to see whether the target could
be reached by 2010 and, more generally, for a con-
tinuous process of planning, monitoring and report-
ing, nationally, regionally and internationally Priority
was given to developing a food insecurity and vul-
nerability information and mapping system
(FIVIMS) that would generate analysis useful to the
overseeing body, the FAQ'S Committee on World
Food Security (WFS 1996: para 60).
Since the WFS, there has been a good deal of activ-
ity on monitoring, particularly in the context of
FIVIMS. An initial meeting was held in Rome in
March 1997, at which the kinds of indicators
needed were discussed (Boutrif 1997). Work since
that time has concentrated on developing practical
guidelines for the monitoring system. The technical
experts at the March meeting felt that a simple bal-
ance-sheet method would not be sufficient to cap-
ture the main elements of food insecurity
]Theyl suggested that increased use be made of
national household surveys that include actual
distribution data related to income, expenditure
and consumption . . . [to help determinel the
prevalence of food insufficiency The partici-
pants also felt that qualitative perceptions of
food insecurity and vulnerability should be
taken into consideration. [Boutrif 1997: 37-38]
Taking these ideas further, the meeting discussed
factors affecting chronic and structural vulnerability
to hunger. It recognised that the factors would 'vary
among and even within countries' (ibid: 38), and
concluded that
Table 2: Food security goals for the year 2000
Nutrition Goals of the World Summit for
Children (1990)
Reduction in severe, as well as moderate mal-
nutrition among children under 5 by half of
1990 levels.
Reduction of the rate of low birth weight
(2.5kg or less) to less than 10%.
Reduction of iron deficiency anaemia in
women by one-third of the 1990 levels.
Virtual elimination of iodine deficiency disor-
ders.
Virtual elimination of vitamin-A deficiency and
its consequences, including blindness.
Empowerment of all women to breast-feed
their children exclusively for four to six
months and to continue breast-feeding, with
complementary food, well into the second year.
Growth promotion and its regular monitoring
to be institutionalised in all countries by the
end of the 1990s.
Dissemination of knowledge and supporting
services to increase food production to ensure
household food security
Source: UNICEF 1991, FAO 1992
[it] was unlikely that a single set of indicators
could be developed that would be applicable
across all countries at all times [ibid: 38]
At the same time, the design of the system had to
reflect the need for international standardisation,
thus,
the partners will have to agree on a well-
defined, simple set of national indicators for
which all countries will need to provide data for
the international database ... [different] data-
bases must be accessible to all partners, and
could be combined to give a full assessment of
the food insecurity and vulnerability situation
[ibid: 39]
We can immediately see here the tension that has
affected other attempts to develop international tar-
gets, between global simplification and standardisa-
tion on the one hand, and local complexity and
specificity on the other. This is not to cast asper-
sions on the professional credibility of those
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Goals of the International Conference on
Nutrition (1992)
1. To eliminate:
Famine and famine-related deaths;
Starvation and nutritional deficiency diseases
in communities affected by natural and
human-made disasters; and
Iodine and vitamin-A deficiencies.
2. To reduce substantially:
Starvation and widespread chronic hunger;
Undernutrition, especially among children,
women, and the aged;
Other important micronutrient deficiencies,
including iron;
Diet-related communicable and non-commu-
nicable diseases; and
Inadequate sanitation and poor hygiene,
including unsafe drinking water.
involved in all these various exercises. But is the
attempt to define universal targets ultimately self-
defeating?
Six other points must be made about the use of tar-
gets in the field of food security
First, history shows that targets have played an
interesting role over the past 25 years in discussions
about food security Targets have been repeatedly
set, repeatedly not achieved, and repeatedly, so to
speak, repeated. Does this say something about the
'smartness' of the goals?
Second, the very concept of undernutrition needs
some discussïon. It is not clear from the WFS text
whether it is intended to refer to an input measure
(in the sense that people are not getting enough to
eat), or an outcome measure (in the sense that peo-
ple show manifestations of undernutrition, for
example by being thin or stunted). In fact, we know
from the background technical papers, and from
the FAO own World Food Survey, from which the
figure of 840 million people is derived, that the
intention is to refer to an input measure, daily per
capita dietary energy supply (DES) (FAO 1996).
FAO specialists know well that this is difficult con-
ceptually, because people need different amounts of
food, not just according to age and gender, but also
according to physical environment, temperature,
altitude, and activity pattern. In a review on this
topic, Pacey and Payne concluded that all estimates
of nutritional requirements have to be treated as
value judgements:
something which is specifically excluded
is the notion of an 'optimum' state of nutritional
health, achievement of which might be the cri-
terion for a requirement level. Any views of
'desirable' or 'optimal' food intakes for human
individuals or groups can only be value judge-
ments. [Pacey and Payne 1985: 70-711
Third, the concept of undernutrition does not sit
very well with the distinction, which is central to
food security analysis, between 'chronic' and 'tran-
sitory' food insecurity (World Bank 1986). The
number of people suffering an energy (or calorie)
deficit at a point of time will reflect the state of the
economy at that time. If the measurement is taken
in a year of abundant rainfall, just after a bumper
harvest, the number will be relatively low. If it is
taken in a drought year, just before the normal time
of year for harvest, it will be much higher. This is
not simply a practical measurement problem that
could be solved, for example, as it is for estimates of
agricultural production, by taking a three-year aver-
age. Rather, it is a question of what food insecurity
is, and how it can be measured. The standard defi-
nition of food security is 'secure access to enough
food at all times for an active, healthy life', and the
key word here is 'secure'. Thus, someone well-fed
this year but with a high risk of not being so next
year could be adequately nourished in the FAO
sense of undernutrition, but deprived in the normal
sense of the term food insecurity
Fourth, even allowing for the problems posed by vari-
ability and risk, undernourishment is a rather poor
proxy for food insecurity This is because current
thinking on food security loads more onto the concept
than simple access to calories. A recent review found
that the term had evolved in very similar ways to the
term poverty, with greater emphasis on subjective
loo
perceptions, and on non-material aspects, including
respect, self-reliance and autonomy:
Flexibility, adaptabihty, diversification and
resilience are key words. Perceptions matter,
intra-household issues are central; importantly
food security must be treated as a multi-
objective phenomenon, where the identification
and weighting of objectives can only be decided
by the food insecure themselves. [Maxwell and
Smith 1992: 41
In the field of food security, the idea of quantitative
'food entitlements' has been dominant for nearly
two decades. Reviewing the new thinking, there is a
strong case for considering, not just the quantity of
food entitlement, but also the quality (Maxwell
1996b). Can this be captured in an international
target?
Fifth, there are real problems in measuring the level
of undernutrition. DES data are not available for
most countries by age, gender or activity level, and
must be interpolated from national food balance
sheets and from information about the distribution
of food within countries. The latter, in particular, is
rarely available - nationally representative house-
hold food consumption surveys were only available
for 18 out of 99 countries covered in the 1996
World Food Survey; for the rest, the distribution
was simply assumed (FAO 1996). Reviewing the
FAO methodology, Smith (1997) accepted the need
for internationally comparable data, but concluded
regretfully that the FAO calculation of undernutri-
tion had
limited practical use as an indicator of food
insecurity for planning and monitoring food
security interventions. It should not be used, in
particular, ... to make cross-country and
regional comparisons of food insecurity ..., to
track changes in food insecurity over time
and to understand the causes of food insecurity
[Smith 1997: 61
This is a damning indictment of the figure at the
heart of the WFS action plan and target.
Finally it is worth asking how the food security tar-
gets relate to the poverty targets of the Social
Summit and the DAC. The food security target is to
halve the number undernourished by 2015, from
840 million to, presumably, 420 million. The DAC
target is to halve the proportion living in absolute
poverty by 2015. It cites World Bank figures to the
effect that 30% of the population of developing
countries, or 1.3 billion people, live below the dol-
lar-a-day poverty line, implying that the proportion
should fall to 15% by 2015 (DAC 1996: 9). No
number is given for those who would then be poor,
but the document states elsewhere that the popula-
tion of the world will rise from 5 billion in 1990 to
7.5 billion in 2015, with virtually all the increase in
developing countries (ibid: 5). Simple arithmetic
enables us to calculate that the number of poor peo-
ple expected in 2015 will be just over one billion.
Putting these figures together implies that in the
mid-1990s over two thirds of poor people were
undernourished, and that in 2015, only 40% will
be so. Something is wrong here, surely, at least in
terms of consistency between the targets.4
In addition to these five points, there are additional
questions to ask about the WFS target. How does a
focus on undernutrition relate to the other targets
adopted by the WSC and the ICN? In particular,
how has the adoption of the new target influenced
resource allocation decisions at country level and in
the international agencies?
None of these points will be new to the profession-
als engaged in measuring hunger. We are all, it
seems, trapped between a rock and a hard place:
anxious to serve the political purpose of developing
international SMART targets, yet all too aware of the
dangers of so doing. Is there a way forward?
4 The Way Forward: Subsidiarity
The argument so far, and the dilemma we have
identified, can be summarised as a series of propo-
sitions:
Everyone recognises that international targets
over-simplify a complex reality For example,
poverty is more than low income, and food
insecurity is more than lack of access to calo-
ries. Poverty and food insecurity are multi-
dimensional.
Arithmetically, the numbers could be made to fit if
undernutrition were a higher criterion than dollar-a-day
poverty, and if it was assumed that the distribution of
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The simple targets are relatively easy to measure
- there are accepted indicators (poverty gap
measures for poverty anthropometric or calorie
intake measures for hunger). However, the
many other dimensions can also be measured,
and a portfolio of indicators is available. Some
are location-specific, others are not.
What might crudely be called 'material' and
'social' indicators are obviously closely related,
and might in some circumstances move
together. In these cases, any one indicator can
act as a proxy for the others. For example,
money-metric measures (income or expendi-
ture) can serve as portmanteau indicators for
poverty However, this is not always true - there
are cases where social and material indicators
will move in different directions, in which case
no single proxy will serve.
Whatever definition is taken, variability and
vulnerability (exposure to risk) must be
tracked. Indicators must illuminate the dynam-
ics of poverty and food insecurity
Any serious poverty or food security analysis
depends on understanding the causes of
poverty and food insecurity, and the impact on
poverty and food insecurity of local and
national interventions.
Most of this is going to be location specific.
There is a strong consensus that local condi-
tions vary and that local perceptions matter.
Furthermore, there are ethical reasons not to
impose outside values.
This means that poverty and food security
analyses need to be diverse and decentralised,
carried out by and with poor people them-
selves. Participatory methods are sometimes
problematic in practice (over-routinised, skill-
intensive, time-consuming for participants), but
the participatory paradigm can offer a route to
efficient, accurate and ethically acceptable data
collection.
people below the poverty line shifted closer to the line
by 2015 - however, these are both somewhat
implausible assumptions.
International and even national targets can be
over-simplistic and reductionist, driven by the
'tyranny of replicability'. The DAC target of
reducing absolute poverty by half by 2015,
defining poverty in income-metric terms, may
be a poor guide to what we are collectively try-
ing to do and how we might achieve it. Much
the same can be said for the WFS target of halv-
ing undernutrition by 2015.
At the same time, however, we must recognise
that simple targets have real value, and that
politicians have a perfectly legitimate need to
find simple messages that will galvanise public
opinion.
There are three ways to solve this dilemma.
First, we might argue that international targets
should simply be abandoned, however, this must
surely be the wrong answer. International targets
are useful. They do galvanise opinion. They do help
to raise resources. So, we do need them.
Second, we might argue that targets should be
refined to reflect the complexity of poverty and
food insecurity In other words, define and collect
more indicators at the international and national
levels. But it is difficult to find good universal indi-
cators, and it may not be fair or realistic to expect
developing countries to collect them. Furthermore,
multiple indicators raise many questions about
weighting and about priorities and resource alloca-
tion. The last thing we want to come out of the DAC
review or the WFS follow-up is a huge, global, cen-
tralised planning system.
The third option is more promising: keep the inter-
national targets universal, unambiguous and sim-
ple, and do little to measure them. Instead,
responsibility for definition and measurement can
be devolved to lower levels, mainly national, but
also sub-national, since many of the arguments we
have made apply nationally as well as internation-
ally In effect, follow the principle of subsidiarity.
The outcome is that the two discourses co-exist. In
other words, we allow the politicians to focus on
the simple indicators, and find space underneath
that umbrella, working in action-research mode
with poor people themselves, on multi-dimensional
poverty food insecurity and human development. If
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we want to monitor progress, a good way to do it
might be by means of regular, location-specific
'poverty reports', similar to poverty assessments or
human development reports: these can be as rich
and diverse as we like.
The third option presents problems, particularly for
those concerned to identify and quantify cross-coun-
try comparisons. That is probably unavoidable.
Politicians and international civil servants will have to
make do with the kind of indicators already easily
available. Any new resources will instead be concen-
trated on helping countries and lower levels of admin-
istration to capture the richness and diversity of the
lives of their own poor and food insecure. In place A,
this might mean that dowry featured strongly; in
place B, it might be violence; in place C, it might be
income. The data would not be comparable. So what?
In the field of poverty, and particularly in relation to
the DAC targets, it seems that monitoring is moving
in this direction, with a core set of easily available
indicators being adopted for international monitor-
ing (Table 3). These may be too many, and some of
the indicators on the list (ironically including
undernutrition) are difficult and expensive to col-
lect. More important, simplifying indicators is not
enough: the DAC must also commit itself to sup-
porting local-level, participatory action-research, in
order to provide the other half of the equation.
In the field of food security, it is too early to tell
whether FIVIMS will adopt an approach consistent
with the option recommended here. 1f it does, it
will simplify the data collection problem interna-
tionally and help countries carry out meaningful
local planning. If it does not, then we are likely to
be lumbered with an expensive and cumbersome
layer of statistical bureaucracy
5 Conclusion
We seem to have reached a conclusion, or rather
three. First, let us allow that there is a theoretical
case for SMART targets, and that, in some cases,
they are effective at galvanising opinion and con-
centrating minds. This does not mean that all inter-
national targets are SMART targets; nor does it
mean that a certain degree of cynicism is not in
order when the same targets reappear at regular
intervals. International civil servants, whose job it is
Table 3: Indicators of international development
Source: DAC http:/Iwww.oecd.org/daclhtmlindic.htm
to devise targets, might think hard in the future
both about appropriate time lines (perhaps a five-
year maximum), and about the scope of their ambi-
tion (stretching, yes, but not to breaking point).
Economic well-being
Reducing extreme poverty
Incidence of extreme poverty: population below $1 per day
Poverty gap ratio: incidence times depth of poverty
Inequality: poorest fifths share of national consumption
Child malnutrition: prevalence of underweight under-fives
Social development
Universal primary education
Net enrolment in primary education.
Completion of fourth grade of primary education
Literacy rates of 15 to 24 year-olds
Gender equality
Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education
Ratio of literate females to males (15 to 24 year-olds)





Births attended by skilled health personnel
Reproductive health
Contraceptive prevalence rate
HIV prevalence in 15 to 24 year-old pregnant women
Environmental sustainability and regeneration
Environment
Countries with national sustainable development strategies
Population with access to safe water
Intensity of freshwater use
Biodiversity: land area protected




Second, however, we should agree that interna-
tional targets have only a tenuous connection to
the real world of national planning and national
resource allocation. These activities need to be
Other selected indicators of development
GNP per capita Aid as % of GNP
Adult Literacy Rate External Debt as % of GNP
Total Fertility Rate Investment as % of GDP
Life Expectancy at Birth Trade as % of GDP
guided by quite a different epistemology, one that
recognises the richness, diversity and complexity
of real-world situations, and builds on the knowl-
edge, insights and ideas of poor people themselves.
There are narratives to be reported about poverty
and food insecurity, and they will bear very little
relation to the narratives implied by international
targets.
Finally, we should also recognise that we have done
more here than simply to say that countries should
produce national action plans to implement the tar-
gets agreed internationally National action plans
are a popular next step in the follow-up to interna-
tional conferences, The very number of plans
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